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 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Douglas Meyer appeals, contending the district court erred when it denied his 
pretrial motion for a necessity defense jury instruction, based on his and his wife’s 
medical needs, in his possession of marijuana case.  In response, the State argues that, 
based on other potential factors, Mr. Meyer has not actually proved that defense, and 
that the Idaho Supreme Court opinion, which the State concedes supports Mr. Meyer’s 
argument, should be overruled.   
The State’s arguments are premised on misunderstandings and misapplications 
of the relevant law in Idaho.  The result is that the State is effectively and improperly 
asking this Court to invade the province of the jury and weigh the proffered evidence on 
the necessity defense, and to usurp the power of the Legislature and abrogate the 
common law as to the availability of the necessity defense.  As such, this Court should 
reject those arguments.   
Because the necessity defense is applicable in Mr. Meyer’s case and a 
reasonable view of the proffered evidence shows he has met his prima facie burden as 
to that defense, this Court should reverse the erroneous denial of his motion for the 
necessity defense jury instruction and remand this case for further proceedings. 
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in 
Mr. Meyer’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUE 
Whether the district court erred when it denied Mr. Meyer’s request for a jury instruction 
on his necessity defense. 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Meyer’s Request For A Jury Instruction On 
His Necessity Defense 
 
 
A. The State’s Arguments Effectively Call For This Court To Usurp The Jury’s 
Authority And Weigh The Proffered Evidence Itself To Determine Whether It 
Actually Establishes The Necessity Defense  
 
The role of the judge in determining whether to instruct the jury on an affirmative 
defense is necessarily limited to evaluating whether, if the jury were to believe the 
evidence proffered by the defendant, that evidence would meet the elements of the 
affirmative defense.  State v. Chisholm, 126 Idaho 319, 321 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing 
United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 416 (1980)).  This is a product of the 
constitutionally-based principle that the jury is the sole arbiter of whether the evidence 
presented is sufficient to make out the affirmative defense.  See, e.g., Bailey, 444 U.S. 
at 416; State v. Hastings, 118 Idaho 854, 856 (1990).  Therefore, if any reasonable view 
of the facts supports the requested affirmative defense instruction, the district court 
should give that instruction.  State v. Beeks, 159 Idaho 223, 231-32 (Ct. App. 2015); see 
Hastings, 118 Idaho at 856 (holding that the defendant’s evidence about her rheumatoid 
arthritis and use of marijuana to alleviate the symptoms thereof was sufficient to meet 
her prima facie burden on the necessity defense). 
In applying the proper standard of review in this case, it is important to remember 
that the State charged Mr. Meyer in the alternative – either possession with intent to 
deliver or simple possession in excess of three ounces.  (R., pp.48-49.)  Thus, the 
necessity defense instruction was proper if it spoke to either of the alternative charges.  
Compare State v. Tadlock, 136 Idaho 413, 415 (Ct. App. 2001) (holding that the 
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requested instruction was proper as to the lesser included charge of simple 
misdemeanor possession alleged in that case, but the failure to give the instruction was 
harmless in that case because the jury had convicted on the greater charge).  Here, 
unlike Tadlock, the simple possession charge is not a lesser included offense and it is 
the only basis for Mr. Meyer’s current judgment of conviction.  (R., pp.48-49, 179.)  On 
the simple possession charge, then, Hastings is practically identical to Mr. Meyer’s 
case.  (See App. Br., p.9.)  In both cases, the defendant presented evidence of his or 
her medical condition and use of marijuana to alleviate the symptoms thereof.  
According to Hastings, that is enough to satisfy Mr. Meyer’s prima facie burden for the 
necessity defense.  See Hastings, 118 Idaho at 855-56.  In fact, the State concedes that 
Hastings supports Mr. Meyer’s argument in this regard.  (Resp. Br., p.9.) 
Nevertheless, the State argues that, because Mr. Meyer could have made other 
arrangements, and so, not brought the marijuana to Idaho, he has not actually 
established a necessity defense.  (Resp. Br., pp.7-10.)  It also asserts Dr. McLennon’s 
medical evaluation of Mr. Meyer, confirming that his condition merits medicinal use of 
marijuana, is unreliable because of the doctor’s personal opinions about marijuana.  
(Resp. Br., p.7.)  Those arguments present a jury question, not an argument that 
Mr. Meyer failed to meet his prima facie burden.  Compare Hastings, 118 Idaho at 856 
(“It is for the trier of fact to determine whether or not she has met the elements of that 
defense.”).  Therefore, those arguments are improper and should be rejected. 
One reasonable view is that the jury believes Mr. Meyer’s proffered evidence – 
showing he needed to have his marijuana with him as he travelled through Idaho 
because of his medical conditions, and he needed to have his wife’s medicinal 
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marijuana with him as he, the only designated provider of her prescribed medication, 
was going to meet her for an extended vacation – and disbelieves the State’s argument 
that there were other arrangements he could have made, such as not traveling with the 
marijuana.  Similarly, even if the State disagrees with Dr. McLennon’s conclusions, that 
does not mean the jury had to disbelieve the doctor as well.  The jury reasonably could 
find Dr. McLennon credible, and so, based on the proffered evidence, reasonably find 
the elements of the necessity defense.  Compare Hastings, 118 Idaho at 855-56.   
Since the State’s arguments go to the weight, not the admissibility, of 
Mr. Meyer’s proffered evidence, the State is effectively asking this Court to invade the 
province of the jury and weigh the proffered evidence.  Such arguments are improper.  
See, e.g., Hastings, 118 Idaho at 856.  Rather, as discussed in depth in the Appellant’s 
Brief, pages 7-16, Mr. Meyer met his prima facie burden under the proper standard.  
Compare id. at 855-56.  As such, under the proper standard, the district court erred in 
denying Mr. Meyer’s motion for an instruction on that defense. 
The State also contends the necessity defense should not be applied in this case 
based on two melodramatic predictions – first, that finding Mr. Meyer has met his prima 
facie burden would “essentially allow the defense as a matter of law in ‘medical 
marijuana’ situations.  Second, such a holding effectively creates a medical exception to 
Idaho’s marijuana laws.”  (Resp. Br., p.10.)  Both predictions drastically overstate the 
effects of properly applying Idaho law in this case, and both are actually empirically 
disproved.   
As to the State’s first assertion, defendants seeking to raise the necessity 
defense in medical marijuana cases are still obligated to make a prima facie showing 
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that the defense is proper on the facts of their cases before they can present that 
defense to a jury.  See Hastings, 118 Idaho at 855-56.  Thus, in the twenty-six years 
since Hastings determined that defense was potentially available in such cases, the 
courts have continued to bar that defense if the defendant failed to meet his prima facie 
burden.  See, e.g., State v. Beavers, 152 Idaho 180, 184 (Ct. App. 2010) (finding that 
the defendant had failed to present evidence on the third prong of the necessity 
defense); Tadlock, 136 Idaho at 415 (explaining that the defendant had not presented 
evidence on the first prong of the necessity defense, such as would justify his intent to 
deliver marijuana under that defense).  Therefore, the idea that allowing the necessity 
defense to be presented when the requisite evidence is present, such as in Hastings or 
this case, will result in all defendants in all medical marijuana cases being able to 
present that defense as a matter of law is empirically disproved. 
Similarly, the fact that no medical exception to Idaho’s marijuana laws has 
developed in Idaho’s jurisprudence since the Hastings Opinion was issued empirically 
disproves the State’s second prediction.  Most of the cases citing Hastings do not deal 
with medical marijuana at all.  See, e.g., State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413, 417-18 (2009) 
(citing Hastings for its discussion of the elements of the necessity defense in an 
unlawful possession of wild or exotic animals case).  And, in regard to the two of the 
cases which cite Hastings and actually deal with medicinal marijuana, neither 
establishes the wholesale exception the State predicts.  See Beavers, 152 Idaho 180; 
Tadlock, 136 Idaho 413.  Rather, those two cases reinforce the restrictions on the 
application of the defense.  See id.  Therefore, the State’s prediction that allowing a 
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necessity defense in such cases like Hastings or Mr. Meyer’s will judicially create a 
medical exception to possession of marijuana is wholly unfounded. 
Ultimately, though, this Court should apply the law as it exists in regard to the 
necessity defense.  Mr. Meyer presented evidence which, if believed by the jury, would 
establish each element of the proposed necessity defense.  Therefore, under Idaho law, 
Mr. Meyer, like the defendant in Hastings, was entitled to an instruction on the necessity 
defense.  The district court erred by denying his request for that instruction.   
 
B. The State’s Argument To Overrule Hastings Effectively Asks This Court To 
Invade The Province Of The Legislature And Abrogate The Common Law  
 
Given its concession that Idaho law, per Hastings, supports Mr. Meyer’s 
argument, the State argues that this Court should change the law in that regard by 
overruling Hastings.  (Resp. Br., pp.9-14.)  As the party seeking to set aside the rule of 
stare decisis, the State bears the burden of proving the prior decision is “manifestly 
wrong,” “unjust or unwise,” or “overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious 
principles of law and remedy continued injustice.”  Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 
119 Idaho 72, 77 (1990).   
The State has failed to carry this burden because its argument fundamentally 
misunderstands the operation of the common law within Idaho’s legal framework.  As a 
result, the State is effectively asking this Court to usurp the Legislature’s power to 
decide whether the operation of the common law should be curtailed.  Therefore, 
overruling Hastings would not vindicate, but rather, would obfuscate, the plain, obvious 
principles of Idaho law and would result in new injustices heretofore avoided by the 
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Hastings decision.  As such, this Court should reject the State’s invitation to overrule 
Hastings because it is not manifestly wrong under Idaho law. 
The necessity defense existed at common law.  See, e.g., Hastings, 118 Idaho at 
855.  The common law has been an intrinsic part of Idaho’s legal framework dating back 
to territorial days:  “In 1864, the [L]egislature adopted what is now codified as I.C. § 73-
116,” which incorporates the common law into Idaho’s legal framework insofar as it is 
not inconsistent with or repugnant to other laws passed.  State v. Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 
146 (2010), abrogated on other grounds by Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 
151 Idaho 889 (2011); see also IDAHO CONST. Art XXI, § 2 (providing that all territorial 
laws would remain in effect upon gaining statehood).  As a result of that incorporation, it 
is a “well-established principle of law in this jurisdiction that it is the province of the 
[L]egislature to modify the rules of the common law.”  Olsen v. J.A. Freeman Co., 117 
Idaho 706, 719 (1990).  Naturally, the Legislature can do that by either expressly saying 
so or by passing an act which is not reconcilable with the common law.  See id. at 717.  
As such, the necessity defense is in effect in Idaho unless the Legislature curtails it by 
some statutory enactment.  See Olsen, 117 Idaho at 719.   
To that point, the Hastings Court necessarily concluded that the common law 
necessity defense is not repugnant to or inconsistent with Idaho’s Controlled Substance 
Act (CSA) because Hastings expressly allowed the defendant to present that defense to 
a charge of unlawful possession of marijuana under that act.  Hastings, 118 Idaho at 
856; see, e.g., Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 471 (1993) (indicating there is a 
presumption that the judge knows and correctly applies the law); Bradbury v. Idaho 
Judicial Council, 149 Idaho 107, 118-19 (2009) (same).  Since “the rules of common law 
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are not to be changed by doubtful implication,” Idaho’s CSA did not change the 
operation of the common law defense of necessity in Idaho.  Statewide Const., Inc. v. 
Pietri, 150 Idaho 423, 429 (2011) (internal quotation omitted), abrogated on other 
grounds by Verska, 151 Idaho 889. 
That means, since the Hastings decision was issued, it has been the 
Legislature’s sole prerogative to amend Idaho’s CSA if it determined the common law 
defense of necessity should no longer apply in that context.  Compare Doggett v. Boiler 
Engineering & Supply Co., 93 Idaho 888, 890 (1970) (noting that, when the Idaho 
Supreme Court determined the common law prevented a cause of action from surviving 
the death of a party, “[t]he [L]egislature promptly thereafter struck down the ruling of the 
Court in Bullock[1] by the enactment of [a statute] permitting the survival of [such] an 
action”) (emphasis added), overruled on other grounds as stated in Evans v. Twin Falls 
County, 118 Idaho 210, 215-16 (1990).  The Legislature has not made any move to 
amend the CSA to proscribe the application of the common law necessity defense since 
the Hastings Opinion was issued.  See generally I.C. §§ 37-2701, et seq.  Therefore, 
the common law necessity defense continues to apply in that context. 
Thus, the State’s argument for this Court to overrule Hastings and forbid 
application of the common law necessity defense to the CSA is, effectively, an 
argument for this Court to abrogate the operation of the common law on its own 
prerogative.  That is something the courts are not authorized to do:  “it is the province of 
the Legislature, and not of the court, to modify the rules of common law.  The court has 
                                            
1 Moon v. Bullock, 65 Idaho 594, ___, 151 P.2d 765, 767 (1944), overruled on other 
grounds as stated in Doggett, 93 Idaho at 890. 
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no more right to abrogate the common law than it has to repeal the statutory law.”  
Bullock, 151 P.2d at 771 (internal quotation omitted) (emphasis added); cf. 
Moon v. North Idaho Farmers Ass’n, 140 Idaho 536, 544 (2004) (quoting Bullock for this 
point).  Therefore, the State’s request for this Court to overrule Hastings is improper and 
should be rejected.   
Besides, Hastings is not an incorrect decision.  The mere fact that a certain 
action was criminalized does not mean that affirmative defenses are ipso facto 
irreconcilable with that criminalization.  While contrary in outcome, the two concepts are 
designed to operate coherently:  the purpose of an affirmative defense is that an 
otherwise-criminalized action will be excused based on a particular set of facts.  See, 
e.g., Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 6-7 (2006).  Thus, Hastings’ conclusion – that 
medical necessity can be an affirmative defense to possession of marijuana – is not 
inconsistent with plain and ordinary principles of Idaho law.   
In fact, the Legislature’s actions in 2015 demonstrate that a medical necessity 
exception is not repugnant to or inconsistent with Idaho’s CSA.  Both houses of the 
Sixty-Third Legislature passed a bill which would have created an exception within 
Idaho’s CSA to allow possession of cannabidiol oil, a derivative of the marijuana plant, 
in limited circumstances because the Legislature recognized the beneficial use of 
cannabidiol oil in treating “intractable seizure discord[s].”  S1146, 63rd Leg. (Idaho 
2015) (not enacted due to gubernatorial veto).  Therefore, the Legislature’s actions 
indicate application of a medical necessity defense, like the one recognized in Hastings, 
is not manifestly wrong under Idaho law.   
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Finally, the State contends that this Court should overrule Hastings by adopting 
the rationales used in United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyer’s Cooperative, 532 
U.S. 483 (2001).  (Resp. Br., pp.11-14.)  However, the proper understanding of the 
operation of common law within Idaho’s legal framework discussed supra reveals the 
State’s reliance on Oakland Cannabis to be wholly misplaced.  That is because Oakland 
Cannabis’s decision is based on the relationship between federal law and common law, 
a relationship that is drastically different than the relationship between Idaho law and 
common law. 
Specifically, Oakland Cannabis’s decision – that, since the federal CSA forbids 
possession of marijuana “except as provided by this subchapter,” and there is no 
provision of that subchapter allowing for a necessity defense, the necessity defense did 
not apply to possession of marijuana under the federal CSA – was dictated by the fact 
that “[t]here is no federal general common law.”  Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 
78 (1938); cf. Oakland Cannabis, 532 U.S. at 490 (“under our constitutional system . . . 
federal crimes are defined by statute rather than by common law.”) (citing United 
States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32, 34 (1812)).  Essentially, Oakland Cannabis’s decision is 
that, since the common law did not apply generally under federal law, the common law 
necessity defense could not apply absent an act of Congress.  See Oakland Cannabis, 
532 U.S. at 489-95. 
This more complete understanding of the decision in Oakland Cannabis 
demonstrates its rationales are diametrically opposed to Idaho law.  The prevailing rule 
in the federal context is:  “Whether, as a policy matter, an exemption should be created 
is a question for legislative judgment, not judicial inference.”  Oakland Cannabis, 532 
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U.S. at 490 (internal quotation omitted) (emphasis added).  By contrast, the prevailing 
rule in Idaho law is:  “the statutory enactment is essential to repeal, abrogate, or change 
the rules or doctrine of the common law.”  Bullock, 151 P.2d at 771 (emphasis added); 
cf. Pietri, 150 Idaho at 429.  That means, while the necessity defense is not available in 
the federal context unless Congress specifically authorizes its use, in Idaho, the 
necessity defense is available unless the Legislature specifically circumscribes its 
applicability.  This fundamental difference in the function and force of common law 
within the respective legal frameworks renders Oakland Cannabis’s rationales 
inapplicable to Idaho law.   
In fact, the Supreme Court made it clear that its decision in Oakland Cannabis 
was narrow and applied only to the interpretation of the federal code:  “we share Justice 
Stevens’ concern for showing respect for the sovereign States that comprise our 
Federal Union.  However, we are construing an Act of Congress, not drafting it.”  
Oakland Cannabis, 532 U.S. at 494 n.7 (internal quotations omitted); cf. id. at 499-500 
(Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (explaining that the majority opinion contained 
“broad dicta” and a narrow holding which was a product of the particular way the case 
arose below, and the particular question considered on appeal).  Justice Stevens’ 
observation that Oakland Cannabis is narrow in scope is accurate.   
The alleged violation of the federal CSA in that case arose in contempt 
proceedings relating to the Oakland Cannabis Buyer’s Co-op’s refusal to comply with a 
preliminary injunction to stop selling marijuana.  Oakland Cannabis, 532 U.S. at 487.  
During those proceedings, the co-op moved to amend the terms of the injunction based 
on the medical needs of its customers.  Id. at 487-88.  Ultimately, the co-op purged its 
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contempt, leaving the denial of its motion to amend the injunction as the only issue on 
appeal.  Id. at 488.  The Ninth Circuit reversed, remanding the case for entry of an 
amended injunction with a medical necessity exception.  Id. at 488-89.  The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to discuss the propriety of the amended injunction in light of the 
language of the federal CSA.  Id. at 489.  Therefore, given its unique procedural history 
and basis for decision, the cross-application of Oakland Cannabis’s rationales regarding 
the operation of the federal code on the terms of an injunction issued under federal civil 
law to Mr. Meyer’s state criminal case is even more dubious.   
In fact, some states have refused to apply Oakland Cannabis to questions of 
state law for just such reasons.  See, e.g., Ter Beek v. City of Wyoming, 846 N.W.2d 
531, 538 n.5 (Mich. 2014) (explaining that Oakland Cannabis held “in a federal 
prosecution under the CSA, there was no medical necessity defense available under 
federal law, regardless of whether that defense would be available under state law.”); 
People v. Mower, 49 P.3d 1067, 1071 n.2 (Cal. 2002) (explaining Oakland Cannabis 
“involves the interpretation of federal law, has no bearing on the questions before us, 
which involve state law alone.”).  This Court should similarly refuse to extend the 
rationale of Oakland Cannabis because of the fundamental difference in the operation 
of Idaho’s state law and federal law on this issue.   
Under Idaho law, the common law necessity defense is available per statute, and 
the power to curtail that availability is solely the Legislature’s.  The State has not 
presented any reason, apart from the inapplicable rationales of Oakland Cannabis, for 
this Court to overrule the case which recognizes the Legislature has not done so.  As 
such, the State is effectively asking this Court to do something beyond its authority – 
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abrogate the common law.  Therefore, the State has failed to carry its burden to justify 
overruling Hastings.  
Since Mr. Meyer has met his prima facie burden under Hastings to show the 
evidentiary basis for the necessity defense in his case, he should have been allowed to 
present that defense to a jury with appropriate instructions.  The district court erred by 
denying his motion for the proper instructions.  Therefore, this Court should remand this 
case so that a jury can determine whether the evidence actually proves the claimed 
defense. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Meyer respectfully requests this Court reverse the order denying his motion 
for a necessity instruction, vacate his conviction, and remand this case for further 
proceedings. 
 DATED this 29th day of April, 2016. 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      BRIAN R. DICKSON 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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